THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT
THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT Ch. 1—on political power §2-3: political power defined Ch. 2—on the state of nature §4. All men naturally in a state of perfect freedom to order actions, dispose of possessions and persons, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or depending upon will of any man. What is the law of nature? Reason—see section 6.
This is also a state of equality: all power/jurisdiction is reciprocal, i.e., no one has more than any other. It is “evident”—nothing could be moreso—that creatures of same species/rank born to same advantages of nature and same faculties are equal, unless God Himself should obviously set one above another by an “evident and clear appointment,” i.e., the sort of thing that one could not be wrong about.
§6. Liberty is not identical with license. Liberty accords with the law of nature. What’s that? Reason. Liberty, then, is rational freedom. In the state of nature all men are obliged to the law of nature, which teaches all men who will but consult it. What’s the problem here, then? Not all men will consult it. If men consult it, it teaches that they are all equal and independent, the workmanship of God and therefore free from molestation by other men. Because of this and their equivalent faculties, there is no natural subordination of one man to another, therefore no man has a right to destroy or use any other man. The law of nature says every man is bound to preserve himself and, when there is no conflict, to preserve the rest of mankind. §7. Since the law of nature wills peace and the preservation of mankind, in the state of nature every man has the responsibility for executing the law of nature. Every man therefore has a right to punish. Why? It’s because the law of nature would be in vain without penalties attached. Since state of nature is a state of perfect equality, there is no natural judge to whom to appeal. Every man is his own judiciary and his own executive. §8. Thus in the state of nature man has power over another only when that other violates the law of nature, which is reason. This power, however, is limited to what is required for restraint and reparation. Punishment is not vengeance but the making whole again of the injured and the teaching of the offender not to do it again. The standard in nature is the law of nature itself, which is to say “reason and common equity,” which is the measure set by God for men’s security. §11. Because of the duty to preserve all mankind, all men have the right to punish violations of the law of nature; reparations, however, can only be taken by the one who has been harmed. The criminal who violates the law of nature has abandoned reason, the “common rule and measure” God has given to mankind, and by his deed has declared war on all man kind. Like a dangerous beast, he may be slain—he has abandoned his humanity.
§12. What about lesser breaches? Should they be punished by death? No, but with degree and severity that make it an ill-bargain for offenders. §14. Who really lives in this state today? Rulers. International relations is the state of nature. Ch. 3—on the state of war §16. State of war is state of enmity and destruction declared by sedate settled design on another mans life. it is reasonable that the one so threatened has a right to destroy the source of the threat. All men are to be preserved, but when that is not possible, the safet of the innocent is to be preferred. §17. The one who puts himself into a state of war may be destroyed, and the one who attempts to enslave someone puts himself into a state of war with that person. Slavery is thus a violation of the natural law and therefore unreasonable. The slave can legitimately slay his so-called master. §19. The difference between state of war and state of nature, confounded by Hobbes, consists in this: men living together according to reason without a common superior, with authority to judge between them, is the state of nature. This is the state of nature in the high sense. In the low sense, as Locke has implicitly admitted, it’s Hobbes. §20. State of war continues until the aggressor sues for peace on terms acceptable to the aggrieved. If that doesn’t happen, it continues until the aggressor is destroyed (remember, his actions declare himself at war with all mankind—that’s why it doesn’t end if the aggrieved party is destroyed). §21. To avoid this state of war, men form governments. Ch. 4—on slavery §23. Man cannot voluntarily enslave himself, and forcible enslavement is, as we have seen, a cause for war. Ch. 5—on property §34. God gives world to men in common, for their benefit, He cannot have meant it to be uncultivated. §37. Appropriating land to oneself does not lessen but increases the common stock of mankind. Who makes better use of land, the farmer with one acre or the nobleman with a hundred acres? Locke’s argument is the small farmer will make better use.
